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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
In this consolidated appeal of four separate cases, Curtis Glenn Hartshorn 
contends the district court erred in conducting a hearing on Hartshorn's post- 
judgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea in Case No. CR-2006-0019594 
(Docket No. 33917) without first appointing counsel, and abused its discretion in 
denying his Rule 35 motions in all four cases. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinqs 
On March 24, 2006, the state charged Hartshorn with delivery of a 
controlled substance in Bonneville County Case No. CR-06-5769 (Docket No. 
33914). (#33914 R., pp.6-7.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hartshorn pled 
guilty to an amended charge of possession with intent to deliver and the state 
agreed to dismiss the charges in four other cases. (#33914 R., pp.17-18, 26-30.) 
The court imposed a unified ten-year sentence with three years fixed, but 
suspended the sentence and placed Hartshorn on probation for five years. 
(#33914 R., pp.46-52.) 
Less than three months later, the state charged Hartshorn with escape in 
Bonneville County Case No. CR-06-14327 (Docket No. 33915). (#33915 R., 
pp.4-5.) In the three months following the escape charge, the state charged 
Hartshorn with grand theft and aggravated assault in Bonnevifle County Case 
No. CR-06-19594 (Docket No. 33917), and with four counts of issuing a check 
without funds in Bonneviile County Case No. CR-06-17236 (Docket No. 33916). 
(#33916 R., pp.4-5; #33917 R., pp.4-5.) Hartshorn entered into a plea 
agreement which disposed of the charges in all three new cases. Specifically, 
Hartshorn pled guilty to Escape in Case No. CR-06-14327, one count of issuing 
checks without funds in Case No. CR-06-17236, and grand theft in Case No. CR- 
06-1 9594, and the state dismissed the remaining counts alleged in those cases. 
(#33915 R., pp.14-18; #33916 R., pp.14-18; #33917 R., pp.14-18.) Prior to 
sentencing in these three cases, Hartshorn submitted a letter requesting 
withdrawal of his guilty pleas. (Letter filed December 7, 2006 ("Letter") 
(Augmentation); #33915, 12/18/06 Tr., p.19, Ls.3-12.) Hartshorn also requested 
withdrawal of his guilty plea in Case No. CR-06-5769. (Letter.) 
The court conducted a hearing on Hartshorn's motion at which Hartshorn 
was represented by counsel. (#33915, 12/18/06 Tr., p.19, Ls.3-12.) At that 
hearing, Hartshorn agreed to withdraw his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas if 
the court would proceed to sentencing using the PSI prepared in relation to Case 
No. CR-06-5769. (#33915, 12/18/06 Tr., p.19, Ls.13-21.) The court agreed, and 
the cases proceeded to sentencing. (#33915, R., p 25.) At that same hearing, 
Hartshorn admitted he violated his probation in Case No. CR-06-5769 and 
agreed to disposition of that violation that same day. (#33915, Tr., p.27, Ls.8- 
11 .) The court thereafter imposed sentence as follows: (1) one year fixed for the 
escape conviction in Case No. CR-06-14327, consecutive to the sentence 
imposed in Case No. CR-06-17236; (2) three years fixed for the insufficient fund 
check conviction in Case No. CR-06-17236, concurrent with the sentence 
imposed in Case No. CR-06-5769; (3) twelve years with four years fixed for the 
grand theft conviction in Case No. CR-06-19594, concurrent with the sentences 
imposed in Case Nos. CR-06-5769 and -17236. (#33915 R., pp.26-27; #33916 
R., pp.39-42; #33917 R., pp.40-43.) In Case No. CR-06-5759, the court revoked 
Hartshorn's probation and ordered his sentence executed. (#33914 R., pp.60- 
63.) 
Hartshorn filed a Rule 35 motion in all four cases (see #33914 R., pp.64- 
74'1, which the court denied on January 22, 2007 (#33917 R., pp.48-49). 
Hartshorn filed timely notices of appeal from the entry of judgment (#33914 R., 
pp.84-89; #33915 R., pp.36-41; #33916 R., pp.51-55; #33917 R., pp.50-55), and 
the Idaho Supreme Court granted his motion to consolidate all four cases for 
purposes of appeal (Order Granting Motion to Consolidate dated March 15, 
2007). 
While his appeals were pending, Hartshorn filed a pro se motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea in Case No. CR-06-19594 (Docket No. 33917). (Motion 
to Withdraw Alford Plea filed October 1, 2007 (Augmentation)). The district court 
denied the motion after a hearing at which Hartshorn appeared pro se via 
telephone. (Minute Entry from February 12, 2008 hearing (Augmentation); Order 
Re: Motion to Withdraw Alford Plea and Objection to Memorandum Decision filed 
March 20, 2008 (Augmentation); Memorandum Decision Re: Motion to Withdraw 
Alford Plea and Objection to Memorandum Decision filed March 20, 2008 
(Augmentation).) 
' The Rule 35 motion is not included in the record on appeal in Docket Nos. 
33915, 33916, or 33917. However, the Rule 35 motion included in the record in 
Docket No. 33914 references all four cases. (#33914 R., p.64.) Additionally, the 
caption on the transcript of the Rule 35 hearing in the record references all four 
cases. (See 1/22/07 Tr. (hereinafter "Rule 35 Tr.").) 
ISSUES 
Hartshorn states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Did the district court deny Mr. Hartshorn his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel by holding a hearing on the motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea where defense counsel was not present? 
2.  Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. 
Hartshorn's Rule 35 motion? 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court conclude that a post-judgment motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea is a collateral attack on the judgment and, as such, does not constitute 
a critical stage that would entitle a defendant to the appointment of counsel? 
2.  Has Hartshorn failed to establish the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion by denying his request for Rule 35 relief? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Hartshorn Has Failed To Show He Was Entitled To Counsel At The Hearina On 
His Post-Judament Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Hartshorn asserts the hearing on his post-judgment motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea was a critical stage such that he had a Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-14.) Hartshorn is incorrect. Because 
Hartshorn's post-judgment was a collateral attack on his conviction, it was not a 
critical stage, and he was not entitled to counsel. Hartshorn has, therefore, failed 
to establish error in the district court's failure to appoint counsel or inform 
Hartshorn of the risks of proceeding pro se. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review for claims of constitutional violations is one of 
deference to factual findings supported by substantial evidence, but we exercise 
free review in the application of the constitutional principles to the facts once 
established." State v. Avelar, 124 ldaho 317, 322, 859 P.2d 353, 358 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
C. Hartshorn Had No Sixth Amendment Riaht To Be Represented By 
Counsel On His Post-Judgment Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to 
counsel during all "critical stages" of the adversarial proceedings against him. 
Estrada v. State, 143 ldaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2007) (citing United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); State v. Ruth, 102 ldaho 638, 637 
P.2d 415 (1981)). Although this right encompasses the first direct appeal, it does 
not extend to post-conviction proceedings. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 
336-37 (2007); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). "The 
determination whether [a] hearing is a 'critical stage' requiring the provision of 
counsel depends . . . upon an analysis 'whether potential substantial prejudice to 
defendant's rights inheres in the * * * confrontation and the ability of counsel to 
help avoid that prejudice."' Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (quoting 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)). 
It is well-established that "entry of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor 
or a felony charge, ranks as a 'critical stage' at which the right to counsel 
adheres." Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (citing Araersinaer v. Hamlin, 
407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam)). 
However, neither the Supreme Court nor any Idaho appellate court has ever 
addressed whether a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea constitutes 
a "critical stage" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. While, as Hartshorn 
notes, a some courts that have addressed the issue have determined that 
motions to withdraw guilty pleas are critical stages to which a defendant is 
entitled to counsel (E Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13 (citing cases)), this position is 
not unanimous, and some of the cases upon which Hartshorn relies have only 
held that the right to counsel exists in the context of pre-judgment motions to 
withdraw a guilty plea, as opposed to post-judgment motions. 
In State v. Winston, 19 P.3d 495, 496 (Wash. App. 2001), the Washington 
Court of Appeals held: "A convicted defendant who moves in the trial court to 
withdraw a guilty plea months after entry of his judgment and sentence is not 
constitutionally entitled to appointment of counsel even if the trial court grants a 
hearing on the motion." The court further explained: 
[Elven if the trial court had actually determined that Winston's plea 
withdrawal motion alleged sufficient facts to warrant a hearing 
under [the state criminal rules], Winston still would not have had a 
constitutional right to appointment of counsel to represent him at 
the hearing. He argues that a postconviction hearing is a critical 
stage requiring appointment of counsel because it "presents a 
possibility of prejudice" to the defendant. While the possibility of 
prejudice is indeed a factor to be considered in deciding whether a 
particular hearing is a critical stage, Winston has put the cart before 
the horse. The preliminary question, under Pennsylvania v. Finley, 
is whether the hearing addresses an application for postconviction 
relief other than the first direct appeal of right. If it does, there is no 
constitutional right to counsel. Here, the time period had long 
expired during which Winston was constitutionally entitled to have 
counsel appointed. The hearing held by the trial court on Winston's 
postconviction motion was not a critical stage of the prosecution, no 
matter how great the potential for prejudice due to the legal and 
factual obstacles that Winston faced in attempting to withdraw his 
plea. 
Id. at 499 (internal citation omitted) -
In Ohio, the appellate courts have concluded that although a court may 
appoint counsel to represent a defendant in relation to a post-judgment motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea, or must, under state law, notify the public defender's office 
and "allow it to decide whether to represent [a] defendant" on such a motion if the 
court determines an evidentiary hearing is required, a defendant is not 
constitutionally entitled to counsel to prepare or present a post-judgment motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Meadows, 2006 WL 1450643 (Ohio App. 6 
Dist. 2006) (unpublished) 
In Kansas, a motion to withdraw a plea after sentencing only requires 
counsel if the motion "reveals facts which, if true, would show manifest injustice 
such that withdrawal of the plea may be warranted." State v. Jackson, 874 P.2d 
1138, 1142 (Kan. 1994); compare State v. Taylor, 975 P.2d 1196, 1201 (Kan. 
1999) ("There is no constitutional right to counsel at each and every post- 
conviction proceeding or motion. However, if a hearing is held and the State is 
represented, the defendant should be represented by conflict-free counsel unless 
the defendant waives the right to counsel.") (citations and quotations omitted); 
State v. Toney, 187 P.3d 138, 141 (Kan. App. 2008) ("Given that a hearing was 
held on Toney's motion to withdraw plea and the State was represented, Toney 
had a constitutional right to conflict-free counsel at the hearing.") Conversely, if 
the motion to withdraw a plea "fails to raise substantial questions of law or triable 
issues of fact requiring an evidentiary hearing, legal arguments, and/or briefs of 
the parties, then the motion does not constitute a critical stage of the proceedings 
and due process does not require appointment of counsel." Id. The Montana 
Supreme Court has similarly concluded that the right to counsel in relation to a 
post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea depends on whether the motion 
"raise[s] the potential for substantial prejudice." State v. Garner, 36 P.3d 346, 
356 (Mont. 2001). 
Although the federal circuit court cases cited by Hartshorn undoubtedly 
hold that a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical stage for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment, those cases involve prejudgment motions to 
withdraw and do not address whether the right to counsel would apply equally to 
8 
a post-judgment motion. See United States v. Davis, 239 F.3d 283 (2" Cir. 
2001); United States v. Garrett, 90 F.3d 210 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Sanchez-Boreto, 93 F.3d 17 (1'' Cir. 1996); United States v. White, 659 F.2d 231 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition to set aside guilty plea based, in part, 
on ineffective assistance of counsel at pre-sentencing motion to withdraw guilty 
plea where defendant had right to effective assistance); United States v. 
Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3rd Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Seqarra-Rivera, 
473 F.3d 381 (2007); Forbes v. United States, 2009 WL 2256017 (2" Cir. 2009). 
In fact, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure I l (d) ,  which governs plea 
withdrawals, expressly prohibits motions to withdraw guilty pleas after sentence. 
The rule states: "After the court imposes sentence, the defendant may not 
withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and the plea may be set aside only 
on direct appeal or collateral attack." F.R.Crim.P. I l(d)(e). 
Most of the state cases cited by Hartshorn also involved pre-judgment 
motions. Browninq v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 360 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); 
Beals v. State, 802 P.2d 2 (Nev. 1990); Martin v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1291 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1992); People v. Holmes, 297 N.E.2d 204 (111. App. Ct. 1973)' But see 
Ducker v. State, 986 So.2d 1224 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); People v. Cabrales, 756 
Wartshorn also relies on Randall v. State, 861 P.2d 314 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); 
however, it is unclear from the court's opinion in that case whether the motion to 
withdraw was made prior to sentencing although it appears it likely was unless 
the court sentenced the defendant between the date he entered his plea on 
December 6, and the date the motion was filed on December 13. 
N.E.2d 461 (111. App. 2 Dist. ~ooI).~ It appears only two states, Washington and 
Florida, have specifically addressed whether there is a distinction between pre- 
and post-judgment motions for purposes of deciding whether a defendant is 
entitled to be represented by counsel on the motion. As noted above, the 
Washington Court of Appeals has held that a defendant is not entitled to counsel 
on a post-judgment motion to withdraw his plea. Winston, supra. 
Florida courts, on the other hand, have concluded there is a right to 
counsel under such circumstances, reasoning that a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea does not constitute a collateral attack on the defendant's conviction (in 
which he would not be entitled to counsel) because such a motion is permitted, 
by rule, to be filed within the thirty-day window for filing an appeal and the denial 
of such a motion may be included as an issue on direct appeal. See, e.g., 
Padqett v. State, 743 So.2d 70, 72-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). This logic, 
however, seems to suggest that the right to counsel for a post-judgment motion 
is not without limits; that is, the right only exists if the motion is filed within the 
thirty-day period provided for in the applicable state rule. Indeed, Georgia courts 
have expressed a similar type of limitation. 
In Georgia, a defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel on a post- 
judgment motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea. See, e.g., Fortson v. 
State, 532 S.E.2d 102 (Ga. 2000). However, this right does not continue in 
perpetuity regardless of when the motion was filed. As explained in Coleman v. 
' Although Hartshorn did not cite Ducker or Cabrales, a review of those opinions 
reveal that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and at least one appellate 
court in Illinois have concluded the right to counsel exists in relation to a post- 
judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 
State, 343 S.E.2d 695, 696 (Ga. 1986), a "trial court may exercise discretion and 
refuse a request to appointed counsel on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed 
after the term of the court at which the judgment of conviction was rendered." 
(Citations omitted.) 
None of the cases cited by Hartshorn provide any compelling basis for 
concluding that a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical 
stage that entitles a defendant, as a matter of constitutional law, to court- 
appointed counsel. Such a motion is properly characterized as a collateral attack 
on the judgment, which, under Supreme Court precedent, has no associated 
right to counsel. Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 336-37; Finley, 481 U.S. at 555. That 
the ability to file such a motion can be restricted or even limited as a matter of 
court rule, see F.R.Crirn.P. l l (d) ,  supports this proposition - if a court can take 
away the right to file a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea, it cannot 
be a critical stage. 
To the extent Hartshorn's argument is premised on the theory that 
because a motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be filed during a period where a 
defendant has a constitutional right to counsel for a particular purpose, such as 
an appeal, the motion also involves a critical stage, such an argument fails. For 
example, there is no constitutional right to counsel at a presentence interview 
even though it occurs between the guilty plea and sentencing, both of which are 
clearly critical stages under the Sixth Amendment. See, e.a., State v. Kauk, 691 
N.W.2d 606 (S.D. 2005) (rejecting right of counsel at presentence interview and 
citing cases); United States v. Benlian, 63 F.3d 824, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1995) 
("[Tlhe presentence interview is not a critical stage of the adversary proceedings, 
whether viewed in the context of pre- or post-Guideline law"); United States v. 
Washington, 11 F.3d 1510, 1517 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[Tlhe presentence interview is 
not a critical stage of the proceeding within the meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment"), cerf. denied, 828 511 U.S. 1020 (1994); United States v. Bounds, 
985 F.2d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[Wle have previously rejected this argument, 
reasoning that no right to counsel attaches at a presentence interview, as the 
interview is not a critical stage of the proceedings"). 
Furthermore, it would be anomalous to require the appointment of counsel 
on a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea, but not require the 
appointment of counsel when the defendant seeks to withdraw his plea through a 
post-conviction petition, since either mechanism can be used to challenge the 
validity of the plea. a Ricca v. State, 124 ldaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
In Idaho, the only right to counsel available to Hartshorn in relation to his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea is that provided in I.C. § 19-852. See State v. 
m, 125 ldaho 522, 523-524, 873 P.2d 167, 168-69 (Ct. App. 1994) ("Right" to 
counsel in pursuit of a Rule 35 motion "may be denied if the trial court finds that 
the motion 'is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means 
would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous 
proceeding.' I.C. § 19-852(b)(3)."). However, Hartshorn neither requested 
counsel pursuant to this statute (or at all) when he filed his motion, nor has he 
argued on appeal that counsel should have been appointed under the ~ t a t u t e . ~  
As such, whether Hartshorn would be entitled to counsel pursuant to I.C. 19- 
852(3) is not before this Court for c~nsideration.~ State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 
923 P.2d 966 (1 996) ("When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions 
of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered."); State v. Martin, 119 
ldaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991) (noting long-standing rule in ldaho 
that an appellate court will not consider issues which are presented for the first 
time on appeal). 
Because there is no constitutional right to be represented by counsel with 
respect to a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea, and because 
Hartshorn has failed to preserve or assert any other right to counsel, Hartshorn's 
claim that he was denied his right to counsel at the hearing on his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea fails. 
In footnote 13 of his brief, Hartshorn notes he was appointed counsel in Case 
No. CR-06-19594 on November 9, 2006 (the date he was arraigned) and that the 
court order appointing the State Appellate Public Defender "retained the 
Bonneville County Public Defender's Office 'for all purposes other than appeal."' 
(Appellant's Brief, p.13 n.13 (citing [#33917] R., p.61)). in footnote 14, Hartshorn 
states: "The record does not disclose why appointed counsel was not present." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.13 n. 14.) According to the Register of Actions for Case No. 
CR-06-19594 (Docket No. 33917), which is attached to the Motion to Augment 
Record and Motion to Keep Suspension of Briefing Schedule in Place that 
Hartshorn filed on November 24, 2008, a Notice of Withdrawal was filed on April 
6, 2007, six months prior to the date Hartshorn filed his motion to withdraw his 
plea. Presumably, counsel's withdrawal is the reason he was not present at the 
hearing. 
Hartshorn has also not challenged whether the district court erred in denying 
his motion. (See Appellant's Brief, p.1 I (statement of issues).) 
II. 
Hartshorn Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Denvinq His Request For Rule 35 Relief 
A. Introduction 
Hartshorn contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
Rule 35 motions given the information he presented at sentencing and "[iln light 
of his substance abuse problems and his commitment to turning his life around." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Harthsorn's claim fails. Given Hartshorn's extensive 
criminal history and his repeated victimization of others, Hartshorn's substance 
abuse and alleged "commitment to turning his life around" hardly establish his 
sentences were excessive as imposed. Moreover, Hartshorn has failed to 
establish he was entitled to Rule 35 relief because he failed to present any new 
information in support of his motion, much less any information that would weigh 
in favor of a reduction of any of his sentences. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal, the question before this Court is not what sentences it would 
have imposed, but rather, whether the district court abused its discretion. 
v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, -, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008) (citing State v. 
Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982)). 
C. Hartshorn Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion In Denvinn His Rule 35 Motion 
"The 'primary consideration [in imposing sentence] is, and presumptively 
always will be, the good order and protection of society."' State v. Butcher, 137 
ldaho 125, 137, 44 P.3d 1180, 1192 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v. Moore, 78 
ldaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956)). Other relevant objectives include 
deterrence of the defendant and the public, rehabilitation, and punishment or 
retribution. Stevens, 146 ldaho at -, 191 P.3d at 226 (citing State v. Cross, 
132 ldaho 667, 671, 978 P.2d 227, 231 (1999)). 
"[Wlhen a defendant brings a Rule 35 motion and claims his sentence is 
excessive even though it is within the statutory limits, the motion must be 
supported with new or additional information." State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732, 
737, 170 P.3d 397, 402 (2007) (citing State v. Huffman, 144 ldaho 201, 203, 159 
P.3d 838, 840 (2007)). When a defendant fails to support a Rule 35 motion with 
new or additional information, the district court's order denying the motion will be 
affirmed on appeal. Id. 
Harthsorn sought Rule 35 relief in all four of his cases. (#33914 R., pp.64- 
68.) In his pro se Rule 35 motion, Hartshorn proclaimed his innocence to the 
grand theft charge, stated the escape charge was the result of him doing "one of 
the knuckle headedest [sic] things [he has] ever done," that he applied to mental 
health court, and noted the "checks that were cashed were stolen last year 
sometime by Shaun Combs or Coates" and the police reports indicate the checks 
were written by a female. (#33914 R., pp.65-67.) Hartshorn's motion further 
notes he is "BPA approved and have ben [sic] put on the waiting list for a bed at 
ARC, Ontario." (#33914 R., p.79.) 
Hartshorn was represented by counsel at the Rule 35 hearing who read 
the Rule 35 motion and noted Hartshorn's concern that the Parole Commission 
would not parole him. (Rule 35 Tr., p.5, L . l l  - p.7, 1.20.) Hartshorn then 
addressed the court and reiterated his belief that "they're going to make me top 
out," which would make him "60 years old when [he] get[s] out." (Rule 35 Tr., 
p.7, L.23 - p.8, L.1.) Hartshorn also requested the court retain jurisdiction. (Rule 
35 Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.10, L.3; #33914 R., p.74.) The court denied Hartshorn's 
requests to reduce his sentences. (Rule 35 Tr., p.11, Ls.1-2; #33914 R., p.82.) 
On appeal, Hartshorn asserts the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his Rule 35 request "in view of the information available at his original 
sentencing hearings, as well as the additional information presented to the 
district court in conjunction with his Rule 35 motions," noting, in particular, "his 
substance abuse problems and his commitment to turning his life around." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.14-16.) The record supports the district court's decision. 
Hartshorn has a lengthy criminal record dating back nearly thirty years. In 
1980, Hartshorn was convicted of writing a check on a closed account and was 
placed on probation. (PSI, p.3.) Hartshorn subsequently violated his probation 
on at least two separate occasions and participated in the retained jurisdiction 
program following the second violation. (PSI, p.3.) 
In 1982 and 1983, Hartshorn was convicted of issuing an insufficient funds 
check, receiving the benefit of retained jurisdiction for the first conviction and a 
three-year indeterminate sentence for the second conviction. (PSI, pp.3-4.) 
Undeterred, Hartshorn was convicted of grand theft and issuing an insufficient 
funds check again in 1988. (PSI, p.4.) At some point, Hartshorn was paroled but 
he violated his parole in 1989 and again in 1990. (PSI, p.4.) Hartshorn was not 
arrested on the 1990 parole violation until 1997 after he was charged with driving 
under the influence in Bingham County. (PSI, pp.4, 7.) Hartshorn's parole was 
revoked and he remained in custody until September 1998. (PSI, p.7.) Notably 
during his final months in custody in 1998, Hartshorn received four disciplinary 
reports -two for possession of contraband, one for battery, and one for failing to 
obey a direct order. (PSI, pp.7, 32-35.6) 
Approximately seven months after being released from custody, Hartshorn 
was charged with driving under the influence and possession of a controlled 
substance. (PSI, p.5.) Eight months after being placed on probation in relation 
to the driving under the influence con~iction,~ Hartshorn violated his probation. 
(PSI, p.5.) Two years later, Hartshorn was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, reckless driving, and 
open container. (PSI, p.5.) Fifteen months after that, Hartshorn was charged 
with leaving the scene of accident and resisting or obstructing officers, and was 
again given the opportunity for probation. (PSI, p.6.) 
While on probation, the state charged Hartshorn with possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver in Case No. CR-06-5769 (Docket No. 
33914), and Hartshorn was, once again, placed on probation. (At33914 R., pp.6- 
7, 49; PSI, p.7.) As previously noted, in the six months that followed, the state 
charged Hartshorn with escape, grand theft, aggravated assault, and four counts 
of issuing a check without funds. (#33915 R., pp.4-5; #33916 R., pp.4-5; #33917 
R., pp.4-5.) 
Unnumbered pages attached to the PSI have been numbered consecutively. 
The possession of a controlled substance charged was dismissed. (PSI, p.5.) 
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When the district court imposed sentence in Case No. CR-06-5769, the 
court specifically took into account Hartshorn's substance abuse problem, 
required him to, as a condition of his probation, "complete any substance abuse 
evaluation and treatment recommended by [his] probation officer," required him 
to "apply to the inpatient ARA program," and told Hartshorn that if he was 
accepted into that program, and a bed was available within 60 days, the court 
would "suspend the balance of the 60 days . . . ordered as a condition of 
probation" so that Hartshorn could "go over to ARA." (#33914, 8/7/06 Tr., p.15, 
L.22 - p.16, L.5.) Notwithstanding this opportunity, Hartshorn violated his 
probation by committing several additional offenses. 
After Hartshorn violated his probation and was before the court for 
disposition of his probation violation and for sentencing in the three other cases 
at issue in this appeal, Hartshorn again offered his substance abuse problem as 
an explanation for his behavior, and advised the court he was "BPA-approved for 
treatment in Ontario, Oregon." (#33914, 12/18/06 Tr., p.24, L.18-20, p.27, L.4.) 
The court noted it "considered [Hartshorn's] statements, the recommendations of 
both attorneys, [and] the nature and circumstances of the crimes" and ordered 
Hartshorn's sentence executed in Case No. CR-06-5769 (Docket No. 33914), 
and imposed a consecutive one-year fixed sentence in Case No. CR-06-14327 
(Docket No. 33915), a unified ten-year sentence with three years fixed in Case 
No. CR-06-17236, and a unified twelve-year sentence with four year fixed in 
Case No. CR-06-19594 (Docket No. 33917), with the latter two sentences to run 
concurrent with the sentence in case No. CR-06-5769 (Docket No. 33914). 
(#33914, Tr., p.27, L.16 - p.28, L.18.) In light of Hartshorn's long criminal 
history, his inability to comply with the terms of probation or parole, and his 
continued criminal offending despite various attempts at treatment and 
rehabilitation, Hartshorn has failed to establish his sentences were excessive as 
imposed. 
Hartshorn has likewise failed to establish he was entitled to Rule 35 relief 
because, despite his claims to the contrary, he failed to present any new 
information in support of his motion. Both his substance abuse problem and his 
alleged "commitment to turning his life around" as evidenced by his inquiry into 
participation in the BPA program were before the court at the time of sentencing. 
As such, the court correctly noted at the Rule 35 hearing that Hartshorn failed to 
provide "any real new information" (Rule 35 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-7), and denied relief 
noting Hartshorn's sentences were "proper" (Rule 35 Tr., p.11, L.2). Hartshorn 
has failed to establish otherwise. 
Because Hartshorn's sentences were not excessive as imposed, and 
because Hartshorn failed to provide any new information in support of his request 
for Rule 35 relief, he has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's 
sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Hartshorn's convictions 
and sentences. 
DATED this 18th day of August 2009. 
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